συγκρίνω, σύγκρισις
(Phryn. Ecl. 243)

D. General commentary

Phrynichus (A.1) criticises Plutarch’s use of the noun σύγκρισις meaning ‘comparison’ in the title of his treatise Comparison between Aristophanes and Menander, arguing that it results from an error in word choice. The lexicographer similarly condemns the use of the verb συγκρίνω meaning ‘to compare’, recommending instead the use of ἀντεξετάζω (literally ‘to try one by the standard of another’, see LSJ s.v.) and παραβάλλω (lit. ‘to parallel with’, see LSJ s.v.).

The verb συγκρίνω is one of the many prefixed formations based on κρίνω (‘to distinguish’, ‘to judge’, from PIE *kre(h₁)i-, ‘to separate’, ‘to distinguish’; see also DELG and DGE s.v. κρίνω). The preverb σύν- conveys the notion of combination; the primary and more archaically attested meaning of συγκρίνω is thus ‘to combine’, ‘to aggregate’, opposite to διακρίνω, ‘to separate’. In this primary sense, in pre-Socratic philosophy συγκρίνω denotes the conglomerations of particles through which bodies are formed and is attested as early as Anaxagoras (C.1, on the use of prefixed forms of κρίνω in Anaxagoras see Sider 1975 and Sider 2005, 136–7). This technical meaning is also found in Epicharmus, in fr. 213: συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη κἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν | γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ’ ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἕν (‘There was unification and division and return again to where it had come from, earth to earth, and air upward. What of these things is difficult? Nothing at all!’; transl. Lask, Most 2016, 261).

From συγκρίνω is derived the noun σύγκρισις, whose primary meaning is ‘combination’ or ‘aggregation’, as opposed to διάκρισις (‘separation’, ‘distinction’). σύγκρισις is attested, in this meaning, from the 5th century BCE onwards: see e.g. Pl. Soph. 243b.5–6: ἄλλοθί πῃ διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθείς (‘suggesting somewhere else separations and aggregations’; cf. also Pl. Phlb. 42c.10). Later on, the original notion of combining two elements evolves into that of making a parallel between them, and σύγκρισις undergoes a semantic shift, developing the meaning ‘comparison’. This meaning, which is attested from Aristotle onwards (C.2), enjoys considerable success, particularly in later prose (see LSJ s.v. σύγκρισις II): for instance, Plutarch uses it in the titles of many of his works, and it often features in Polybius’ Histories (see e.g. 12.26c.1: λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτων διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας οὐκ εἰς σύγκρισιν, ἀλλ’ εἰς καταμώκησιν ἄγει καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὧν βούλεται προΐστασθαι, ‘Further, because of the excess of paradox, he [Timaeus] exposes the men and events that he wants to enhance not to [favourable] comparison, but to mockery’). For what concerns rhetoric, σύγκρισις enters its technicalTechnical language vocabulary as the term assigned to a specific type of progymnasma (preliminary exercise for rhetorical composition; see F.3). In later Greek, σύγκρισις developed further new meanings: in Biblical Greek, for instance, σύγκρισις occurs in the meaning ‘interpretation’ referring to Joseph’s dreams. σύγκρισις meaning ‘comparison’ is ubiquitous in Greek prose (see already Lobeck 1820, 278) but seems alien to poetry. To the best of our knowledge, for instance, the extant comic texts contain no occurrences of this word (note that the fragment 109 Kock formerly included among the fragments of the New Comedy playwright Philemon is actually part of the Comparison of Menander and Philistion, see PCG vol. 7, 317). This also holds true for the verb συγκρίνω, which, in its first poetic occurrence in Apoll.Rh. 4.680–1, features indeed in a zoogonic digression that recalls pre-Socratic science (see Hunter 2015, 178).

Phrynichus (A.1), followed by Thomas Magister (B.2), condemns the more recent meaning acquired by συγκρίνω and σύγκρισις and recommends instead ἀντεξετάζω and παραβάλλω as approved terms meaning ‘to compare’. Both verbs can claim a classical pedigree by virtue of their use by Attic orators: ἀντεξετάζω occurs indeed in Lysias (20, fr. 48) and Aeschines (1.8.11; 1.37.3, in which Trimarchus’ behaviours are measured against the city’s laws), while παραβάλλω occurs in Isocrates (9.34.2–4: εἰ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὰς πράξεις τὰς Εὐαγόρου παραβάλλοιμεν, ‘If we were to compare the deeds of Evagoras with those of each one’ [Transl. Van Hook 1945, 21]); on these verbs see further entry ἀνταναγιγνώσκω, ἀντιβάλλω. Multiple factors may have informed Phrynichus’ dislike for σύγκρισις as ‘comparison’. First, the fact that the authority of ancient and approved authors did not support this use may have caused this meaning to appear ‘counterfeit’ to him (see F.1, on ἀδόκιμος meaning ‘counterfeit’, see Kim 2023, 136–9). Second, the fact that συγκρίνω and σύγκρισις respectively meaning ‘to compare’ and ‘comparison’ belong to technical koine prose (see above) may also have been instrumental in arousing his disapproval. Although Phrynichus’ proscription of the συγκρίνω is clear, the question as to whether or not he accepted the simple verb remains unresolved. Whereas B.1 notes that Demosthenes indeed uses κρίνωκρίνω meaning ‘to compare’ (note, however, that LSJ s.v. κρίνω II.4, translates ‘judging of him by myself’), A.1 – in the form in which we read it – does not mention the simple κρίνω. Incidentally, given that Phrynichus’ disapproval of σύγκρισις and συγκρίνω concerns their inappropriate semantics, his use of σύγκρισις in the Praeparatio sophistica (Phryn. PS 1.1–6Phryn. PS 1.1–6, on which see ἀφῆλιξ, ἀφηλικέστερος) is not a contradiction, for here the term has the technical (grammatical) meaning of ‘comparative’, ‘degree of comparison’ (on this meaning see Bécares Bota 1985, s.v. σύγκρισις, συγκριτικός).

Within later lexicographical sources, which mostly focus primarily on the word’s semantics (beside B.3 and B.4, see also Su. σ 1301), John of Sardis’ commentary on Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata (B.1, 9th century) and Thomas Magister’s Eclogue (B.2) are of particular interest to us because they address the admissibility of σύγκρισις as ‘comparison’ resting on A.1, of which they appear to transmit a more detailed version (see F.1). They may thus allow us to better understand Phrynichus’ position. Indeed, both observe (either directly, as B.1, or indirectly, as B.2) Phrynichus’ rejection of σύγκρισις as ‘comparison’ on the grounds that he views the noun’s earliest meaning, ‘aggregation’, as its only admissible sense, understanding it as the opposite of ‘distinction’, ‘separation’ (διάκρισις in B.1, διάλυσις in B.2). This suggests that Phrynichus’ entry originally included more exhaustive information and may also have dealt with διάκρισις (see F.1 and the apparatus of A.1). John of Sardis’ citation of Phrynichus’ doctrine is also noteworthy in that it furnishes proof that the Eclogue – contrary to former beliefs – circulated either directly or indirectly in Byzantium long before Thomas Magister’s activity. According to Alpers (2009, 147), John had most likely direct access to Phrynichus’ Eclogue, and it is unnecessary to postulate the existence of an intermediate source. Other clues corroborate the notion of the Eclogue’s circulation in Middle Byzantine erudite circles: on the incorporation of some of its materials in the Synagoge and the related expansions, see entry ἀρχαϊκός; on Photius’ use of the Eclogue see Tribulato (2022, 929–31).

E. Byzantine and Modern Greek commentary

Although erudite sources (B.1, B.2) know and transmit Phrynichus’ doctrinal proscription thereof, σύγκρισις meaning ‘comparison’ is widely and continuously attested throughout the Byzantine age. Owing, perhaps, to its frequent occurrence in the technical vocabulary of rhetoric, this is considered a legitimate and standard understanding of the word, as it is also suggested by the remark ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ, ‘in common usage’, in B.2 (on the notion of συνήθειασυνήθεια in Byzantine lexica see AGP vol. 3, forthcoming). Ultimately, the meaning that Phrynichus condemned is that with which συγκρίνω and σύγκρισις (the latter as the learned term σύγκριση) persisted into Modern Greek (see LKN s.v.).

F. Commentary on individual texts and occurrences

(1)    Phryn. Ecl. 243 (A.1)

The entries by John of Sardis (B.1) and Thomas Magister (B.2), both resting on A.1, share several features suggesting that they had access to a more extended version of the Eclogue’s entry (A.1). First, both mention the absence of σύγκρισις from the ancient approved authors, a remark that does not feature in A.1 but that would be in line with Phrynichus’ style, particularly with the relevance that the notion of δόκιμος carries in the Eclogue (on a form’s absence from approved authors, see, in particular, Ecl. 10Phryn. Ecl. 10, 24Phryn. Ecl. 24, 66Phryn. Ecl. 66, 341Phryn. Ecl. 341, 342Phryn. Ecl. 342, 344Phryn. Ecl. 344). Second, both explain the meaning of σύγκρισις accepted by Phrynichus as the opposite of ‘separation’, ‘distinction’ (διάκρισις and διάλυσις, respectively), and B.1 openly ascribes the opposition between σύγκρισις and διάκρισις to Phrynichus’ entry (Φρύνιχος δὲ ὁ ἀττικιστὴς […] λέγων […]). It is remarkable that this contrast is also preserved by a part of the lexicon’s manuscript tradition: family c (on which see Fischer 1974, 9–10) reads ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν ἡ σύγκρισις, καὶ ὅ τι διάκρισις. This passage in family c may preserve a pericope that was originally present in the Eclogue (unless it is a later addition, though this scenario appears rather unlikely). Despite the absence of any certainty regarding the form in which John of Sardis accessed the Eclogue, his remarks testify that the opposition between σύγκρισις and διάκρισις featured in the text of Phrynichus’ entry at an early stage. It should also be noted that A.1 is not the only entry in which Phrynichus focuses on expressions that belong to the technical vocabulary of comparison. Indeed, in Ecl. 188Phryn. Ecl. 188, he criticises the use of ἀντιβάλλω (properly ‘to compare’) in place of ἀνταναγιγνώσκω (‘to read and compare’, ‘to collate’). Phryn. PS 47.16–7Phryn. PS 47.16–7 also deals with the terms for comparison discussed in Ecl. 243 and 188 (see entry ἀνταναγιγνώσκω, ἀντιβάλλω).

(2)    Ioann.Sard. in Aphth. Prog. 180.19–181.10 (B.1)

This passage’s interpretation warrants some explanation. First, one might reasonably wonder whether the group that the label τεχνικοίτεχνικός identifies is the same as or different from that of the τεχνογράφοιτεχνογράφος. While τεχνογράφοι are undoubtedly rhetoricians and theorists of rhetoric (i.e. Aelius Theon, Hermogenes, etc.), the identity of the τεχνικοί is less immediately clear. Given that erudite sources often employ this label for grammarians (and notably for Herodian, the τεχνικός par excellence), it might be tempting to interpret the passage as opposing grammarians and rhetoricians in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, in all other occurrences in John of Sardis’ commentary, the label τεχνικοί consistently refers to theorists of rhetoric, while Aphthonius himself is referred to as τεχνικός (cf. 243.11; 255.24–5). It is more likely, therefore, that the terms τεχνικοί and τεχνογράφοι both refer to rhetoricians and theorists of rhetoric. In short, John of Sardis defends Aphtonius against the criticism that he might incur on the grounds of Phrynichus’ doctrine, arguing that he inherits the use of σύγκρισις ‘comparison’ from the ancient rhetorical tradition of the progymnasmata, for which meaning the Attic pedigree was irrelevant.

(3)    Aphth. Prog. 10.1 (C.3)

In the vocabulary of rhetorical training, σύγκρισις denotes both a specific genre of progymnasma – the comparison – and a rhetorical device of amplification that may be applied within different types of progymnasmata – notably the encomium (ἐγκώμιον), the invective (ψόγος), and the commonplace (κοινὸς τόπος). In the latter case, the comparison with someone (or something) greater is intended to boost the praise (or conversely the blame) afforded to the person (or the thing) who is the subject of the exercise. Aphthonius’ definition of the exercise of comparison might appear obscure at first reading. His definition is indeed more complex than that offered by the progymnasmata’s other theorists – Aelius Theon and Nicolaus (see Theon Prog. 78.23–4, Nicol. Prog. 60.5–10: σύγκρισίς ἐστι λόγος τὸ βέλτιον ἢ τὸ χεῖρον παριστάς, ‘The comparison is a discourse that compares the best or the worst’). A different concept of the exercise of comparison and its scope underlies these definitions. Whereas, according to Aelius Theon and Nicolaus, the elements involved in the comparison must indeed be homogeneous (that is, both must be either good, βέλτιον, or bad, χεῖρον), Aphthonius and Hermogenes also admit a comparison between elements that are opposite by nature (on σύγκρισις in rhetorical training, see Berardi 2017, 262–73; on Aphthonius’ definition see Patillon 2008, 238 n. 207).