ἄκουσμα, ἀκρόαμα
(Moer. α 134, Philemo [Laur.] 354, Poll. 2.81–2)

D. General commentary

Atticist lexicographers (A.1, A.2, A.3, B.1, B.2) express an interest in the mutual relationship between ἄκουσμα and ἀκρόαμα (meaning ‘thing heard’). While they are unanimous in presenting ἄκουσμα as the preferable form, they adopt different approaches towards ἀκρόαμα, which is discouraged by Moeris (A.1) and Philemon (A.2) and, albeit less vehemently, by Thomas Magister (B.2) as typical of koine Greek, while it is deemed admissible by Pollux (A.3) and the entry of the Synagoge (B.1), which rests on an Atticist source.

Both ἄκουσμα and ἀκρόαμα are deverbative nomina rei actae in -μα (Schwyzer 1939, 522–4), respectively from ἀκούωἀκούω (‘to hear’) and ἀκροάομαιἀκροάομαι (from ἄκρος, ‘extremity’ and οὖς ‘ear’, literally ‘to lend an ear’, ‘to listen’; see DELG s.v.; EDG s.v.). Both nouns are, in turn, productive (see DELG s.v.; EDG s.v.): from ἄκουσμα derive the diminutive ἀκουσμάτιον and ἀκουσματικός (‘eager to hear’, ‘[only admitted as] listener [in the Pythagorean school]’, see DGE s.v.), from ἀκρόαμα comes instead ἀκροαματικός (‘designed for hearing only’). Since ἀκούω simply describes the act of hearing, while ἀκροάομαι implies intentional listening, we may assume that ἄκουσμα properly denoted something that was passively heard and ἀκρόαμα something that was deliberately listened to. Indeed, ἄκουσμα typically indicates a rumour or story that has been heard (as in C.1), while ἀκρόαμα denotes a performance intended for entertaining (such as music or recitation at a banquet, as in C.5); however, both may be used more generally to denote something that is heard. The distinction between the two is subtle, and the words are often used interchangeably. A first trace of this overlapping is evident in Xenophon (C.3, C.4), who uses both words in the same context – describing the praise of oneself as the sweetest thing that one might hear (C.3: ἀκούσματος, C.4: ἀκροάματος) – which suggests that ἄκουσμα and ἀκρόαμα were already used synonymously in his time. Given the two forms' semantic overlapping, grammarians assign them different levels of prestige, possibly based both on a diachronic perspective and on a matter of canon. ἄκουσμα is indeed the earlier attested form and occurs in authors who hold a robust status in the Atticist canon, such as Sophocles (C.1), Isocrates, and Plato. ἀκρόαμα, although already attested in Xenophon (C.4, C.5), spreads from the 4th century onwards and gradually gains traction in koine Greek and is used often by Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch.

The coexistence of these words, perceived as doublets, and the competition between them gave rise to debate among Atticist lexicographers. The nebulous distinction between these forms’ meanings is noted by Pollux (A.3), who accepts Aeschines’ use of ἀκρόαμα for ἄκουσμα but rejects Menander’s ἀκουστής for ἀκροατής (‘hearer’, ‘disciple’). Moeris (A.1) and Philemon (A.2) adopt stricter stances: ἄκουσμα is preferable to ἀκρόαμα, whose use they discourage. The gloss preserved in the Synagoge’s tradition (B.1) mirrors a doctrine that discredits the stricter Atticist policy expressed by Moeris (A.1) and Philemon (A.2) and upholds the use of ἀκρόαμα based on the authority of Aeschines (C.2), Xenophon (C.3, C.4, C.5), and Diphilus (C.6, a text that may conceal an early erudite debate on this form, see F.1). It is impossible to identify the source from which such doctrine derives. Reitzenstein’s (1907, 65) attempt to ascribe it to Phrynichus, cautiously followed by de Borries (1911, 150–1; he prints the gloss as Phryn. PS fr. *135 Phryn. PS fr. *135), is not wholly convincing. That the PS expresses a more moderate position than that of Moeris would not be an isolated case, given that the PS occasionally permits the use of semantic or syntactic doublets, describing them as ἄμφω δόκιμαδόκιμος (‘both admissible’): see Phryn. PS 63.8–10Phryn. PS 63.8–10; 66.5–6Phryn. PS 66.5–6; 75.16–7Phryn. PS 75.16–7; 84.22–3Phryn. PS 84.22–3 (on the latter, see entry κυνίδιον, κυνάριον); ἄμφω δόκιμα is moreover restored by de Borries in Phryn. PS 32.5Phryn. PS 32.5 and 46.2Phryn. PS 46.2. Among these entries, Phryn. PS 75.16–7 may provide an intriguing parallel, for in it, Phrynichus proves to be more tolerant than Moeris concerning the admissibility of a form. Phrynichus’ entry labels θρύπτεσθαι and ὡραΐζεσθαι (both ‘to act affectedly’) as ἄμφω <δόκιμα> (δόκιμα is restored by de Borries) and calls into question their coexistence in Eupolis (fr. 393: ὡραιζομένη καὶ θρυπτομένη, ‘[a woman] acting haughty and coy’, on which see Olson 2014, 153–4); while Moeris (α 146)Moer. α 146, by contrast, discourages ὡραΐζω as typical of koine Greek. As far as the canon is concerned, Xenophon and Diphilus are regarded with tolerance in the PS (see Tribulato 2024), despite the latter being a playwright of New Comedy: excluding fragments, Xenophon is mentioned twice (Phryn. PS 45.21Phryn. PS 45.21; 56.17Phryn. PS 56.17) and Diphilus once (Phryn. PS 60.14Phryn. PS 60.14). Although the descent of the Synagoge’s entry (B.1) from the PS is speculatively possible, the hypothesis of such derivation appears destined to remain such, since the entry includes nothing to suggest that it more likely derives from Phrynichus than from another Atticist source. What is certain is that the Synagoge’s gloss rests on an Atticist source expressing a tolerant position toward ἀκρόαμα and admitting a broader literary canon. Incidentally, note that the doctrine expressed in B.1 shows some similarities with Pollux (A.3). Both A.3 and B.1 admit ἀκρόαμα as an alternative to ἄκουσμα and cite the same authors (Aeschines and Xenophon) in support of the word’s admissibility. Such similarities may not suffice to postulate that B.1 rests on A.3: nevertheless, it does not seem impossible that materials from Pollux’ lexicon entered the Synagoge’s tradition, either directly or indirectly, although a possible relationship between the two lexica has yet to be investigated.

The acceptance of ἀκρόαμα is likely to be repeated in the entry of the Etymologicum Symeonis (B.3), where the πληθυντικῶς (‘in the plural’) restored by the editors makes little sense, given that neither ἄκουσμα nor ἀκρόαμα are treated differently depending on the number. Other possibilities appear more likely. One might tentatively restore πλεονάζουσι (cf. B.1) or, remaining more grounded on the forms transmitted by the manuscripts, something linked to πλέον (‘more’): J. Cavarzeran cautiously proposes ἄκουσμα (τὸ) πλεῖστον Ἀττικοί (‘Users of Attic [employ] at most ἄκουσμα’). In any case, B.3 likely means that Attic authors, although they mostly use ἄκουσμα, do not disdain to use ἀκρόαμα. Thomas Magister (B.2) seemingly adopts an intermediate position. Thomas’ item belongs to a cluster of consecutive glosses that he derives from Philemon’s lexicon (see also Thom.Mag. 6.13–15; 7.1–4; 7.5–6; 7.78; cf. Cohn 1898, 354). One might expect him to have shared a strict stance on the issue with his model, but while Philemon (A.2) refuses ἀκρόαμα, Thomas presents ἄκουσμα as preferable (κάλλιον), thus apparently not discouraging ἀκρόαμα outright but allowing a little room for its use. Thomas’ entry (B.2), moreover, includes further information on the doublet ἀκρόασιςἀκρόασις/ἄκουσιςἄκουσις (‘hearing’). ἀκρόασις, well attested in 5th- and 4th-century Attic, is deemed preferable, while the latter, being a later formation (it is attested for the first time in Aristotle but otherwise occurs only in late-antique and Byzantine writings), is labelled as κοινόν. One may speculate that the higher pedigree of ἀκρόασις compared to ἄκουσις may have been instrumental in mitigating Thomas’ judgement regarding ἀκρόαμα. Moreover, one may tentatively posit that the information concerning ἀκρόασις/ἄκουσις may go back to Philemon himself, although it is difficult to determine whether Thomas was able to read a fuller version of Philemon’s lexicon or whether the discrepancies are attributable to Thomas’ reworking of his source. Indeed, the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive (on the relationship between Philemon’s and Thomas’ lexica, see Gaul 2007, 313–4, n. 64; 2008, 189–90 and entries Philemon, Περὶ Ἀττικῆς ἀντιλογίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς λέξεσιν and Thomas Magister, ’Ονομάτων Ἀττικῶν ἐκλογή).

E. Byzantine and Modern Greek commentary

Both ἄκουσμα and ἀκρόαμα are used throughout the late antique and Byzantine periods, albeit with differences in terms of frequency and register. ἄκουσμα is preferred by high-register authors, such as Nicetas Choniates, Anna Comnena, and Eustathius, but also occurs frequently in middle- and middle-high-register authors and genres; for instance, Symeon Metaphrastes often uses it in his rewriting of the older hagiographies with a view to rendering these texts' language more closely aligned with Attic Greek (e.g. Passio martyris Eleutherii 136.8). ἀκρόαμα is rather more typical of lower registers (e.g. John Malalas, Chronographia 9.20.4), although it occasionally occurs in learned writers, such as Basil of Caesarea (e.g. Ep. 2.2.55) and Eustathius (e.g. Or. 6.3.11, but Eustathius uses ἄκουσμα in most cases).

ἀκούω remains in use throughout the centuries (Kriaras, LME s.v.) and remains the standard verb for ‘to hear’, ‘to listen’ in Modern Greek (LKN, ILNE s.v.); the ancient ἀκροάομαι survives in the form ἀκροάζομαι as a learned synonym of ἀκούω or as technical medical verb (‘to auscultate’). Like ἀκούω, ἄκουσμα also persists through the Middle Ages as ‘thing heard’, ‘tale’ (Kriaras, LME s.v.) and remains in use today (see LKN, ILNE s.v.). The ancient ἀκρόασις underwent a change in paradigm from the 3rd-declension inflection in -ις, -εως to the 1st-declension inflection in -η, -ης, becoming ακρόαση (this phenomenon likely began very early in spoken and low-register contexts – the 1st century CE, according to Gignac 1981, 75 – but the old forms remained robustly in use in middle-register texts and formal contexts until at least the 14th century, see CGMEMG vol. 2, 534–6; 552–3). ακρόαση has a range of technical meanings (‘judicial hearing’, ‘audition’, ‘auscultation’) but can also be used more generally to denote ‘thing heard’ (LKN s.v.). ἀκρόαμα and its derivatives (LKN s.v.) are no longer in common use but survive as learned reminiscences.

F. Commentary on individual texts and occurrences

(1)    Diph. fr. 121 (C.6)

The Synagoge’s entry (B.1) attests that Diphilus used both ἄκουσμα and ἀκρόαμα, but it remains unclear in which contexts he did so. Kock (CAF vol. 2, 577) sees in this fragment praise of Demosthenes as worthy of both ἄκουσμα (‘hearing’) and ἀκρόαμα (‘attentive listening’). If this is correct (though nothing explicitly indicates a reference to Demosthenes), the expression ἐκ παραλλήλου in the gloss (B.1) should not be taken as ‘pleonastically’, as is often the case in grammatical works, but as ‘in conjunction’, for the two words in Diphilus are likely intended as different terms rather than semantic doublets. Van Herwerden (1855, 99–100) offers a different interpretation: the concern here would be that of a purist, someone who mocks people, possibly his contemporaries, who erroneously use the two words as synonyms, whereas the ancients differentiated them, as the most learned continued to do. According to Van Herwerden, Diphilus is no stranger to controversy over language, since fr. 124 plays on the confusion between ἀνακεῖσθαι ‘to stand’ and κατακεῖσθαι ‘to lay’ (incidentally, fr. 124 could perhaps be the locus classicus behind Phryn. PS 46.11Phryn. PS 46.11: ἀνακεῖσθαι· τὸ κατακεῖσθαι: see de Borries ad loc. for a proposal for the text’s reconstruction). Fr. 121 (C.6) may also be part of a comment on any character’s way of speaking – for instance, the tendency to use synonyms (see Pérez Asensio 1999, 506); alternatively, it might give voice to a character speaking of (perhaps praising?) his own idiolect (see Maggio 2018, 87–9, with commentary on the fragment and bibliography). In any case, although it is reasonable to assume that the fragment comments on someone’s way of speaking, the lack of context prevents us from drawing conclusions as to who it is and the precise sense of such an observation.