περίστασις
(Antiatt. π 26, Phryn. Ecl. 353)

D. General commentary

The entries in A. discuss the meanings of περίστασις: while the Antiatticist (A.1) seemingly endorses the meaning ‘bad circumstance’ (but see the discussion below), Phrynichus (A.2), whose entry is intended as a counterpoint to that of the Antiatticist (see Valente 2015, 52–5, with references), notes that in both tragedy and comedy the word unequivocally means ‘crowd standing round’, whereas the meaning ‘bad circumstance’ is characteristic of Stoic philosophical jargon.

To better understand the purpose of the two entries, it is first necessary to consider the morphology and semantics of περίστασις. The noun derives from the root of the verb περιίστημι (‘to place round’, but also ‘to stand round about, encircle’) by means of the suffix -τις/-σις (< *-ti-), which was mainly used to form action nouns from verbal stems. Already in the Homeric poems, however, the suffix could also indicate the result of an action as well as concrete objects and instruments (on -τις/-σις, see Vowles 1928, 36–54; Chantraine 1933, 275–89; Holt 1940; de la Villa 2020; Montrasio 2024). Unsurprisingly, then, περίστασις can assume different meanings depending on the context (for this reason, I have not attempted to translate it in a single way in A., B., and C.; for a full discussion of the semantic range of περίστασις and its development over time, see Fitzgerald 1988, 33–46). As is clear from both literary and documentary sources (note that περίστασις occurs about 60 times in papyri from the 3rd century BCE to the 4th century CE), the word may refer to a ‘crowd standing round’, a ‘surrounding space’, a ‘portico (surrounding a hall or temple)’, or a ‘district (surrounding a village)’, but it is also used to mean a ‘state of affairs’, a ‘condition’, a ‘circumstance’. In this latter sense, it came to be used in Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary (as we will see below), often with reference to a bad or unfortunate event or situation (see also the interpretamenta in A.1 and A.2), a meaning frequently attested in Christian authors (see e.g. Fitzgerald 1988, 38–9). A case in point is John Chrysostom, in whose works περίστασις occurs over 150 times (see in particular C.7, where συμφοραί and περιστάσεις may form a synonymic pair, as elsewhere in Christian authors, as noted by Fitzgerald 1988, 39; I thank the anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this passage). As a rhetorical terminus technicus, περίστασις (rendered in Latin as circumstantia: see Quint. Inst. 5.10.104) refers to the circumstances of a case treated by a speaker (see B.4 and the evidence collected by Fitzgerald 1988, 36–7). As a caveat, it should be noted that the rhetorical device of enumerating one’s own misfortunes – known in modern scholarship as Peristasenkatalog (‘peristasis catalogue’) – was not labelled as such in antiquity, as Schellenberg 2013, 123–40 points out; accordingly, catalogues of this kind are not discussed here.

The passage of Teleclides (5th century BCE) quoted by Phrynichus (C.1) is the earliest known occurrence of περίστασις (for a discussion, see Bagordo 2013, 180–3), which is otherwise attested only from the 4th century BCE onwards. By this time, περίστασις already exhibits the aforementioned range of meanings. An example is the famous definition of tragedy attributed to Theophrastus (C.3): here περίστασις must have an abstract meaning, although scholars disagree about what exactly it refers to (see Fortenbaugh 2005, 354–6 for an overview of the issue). Polybius provides another illustration of the range of περίστασις, using the word over 100 times: see the passages cited by the compiler of the Suda entry in B.3, where περίστασις may mean either ‘splendour’ or ‘critical situation’ (on the difficulties raised by B.3, see F.1). Overall, the abstract sense of περίστασις, attested in documentary sources from the 3rd century BCE onwards (the earliest being P.Tebt. 3.703.236 (= TM 5315), come to prevail in Post-classical and Medieval Greek (see also Section E.).

The semantic ambiguity of περίστασις must occasionally have puzzled ancient grammarians: a hint in this direction is provided by Harpocration’s entry in B.1. Here the tentative explanation of the words περίστασιν ποιησαμένου in a passage by Dinarchus suggests that the compiler (or his source) was uncertain about the precise meaning of περίστασις. This uncertainty was further reinforced by the fact that, as Harpocration notes, some ancient MSS of Dinarchus read παράστασις (a word which can mean ‘being beside, presence, arrival’, inter alia) instead of περίστασις – a form whose meaning would also readily fit the context.

Another testimony to the intrinsic semantic ambiguity of περίστασις is provided by Epictetus in C.6. Here Epictetus pretends to misunderstand his ideal interlocutor by contrasting the literal, concrete meaning of περίστασις (‘if you call ‘circumstances’ your surroundings, all things are ‘circumstances’’) with its specialised usage (‘hardships’), which is also discussed by the Atticists.

Epictetus’ passage takes us back to Phrynichus’ assertion that περίστασις is used by the Stoics. It should therefore come as no surprise that, despite the term’s widespread diffusion in Ancient Greek, Phrynichus had precisely the Stoic usage in mind. For a start, Phrynichus must have devoted a great deal of attention to Stoic vocabulary, since words and phrases used by Stoic philosophers are discussed elsewhere in the Eclogue, mostly in order to reject them: see Phryn. Ecl. 245Phryn. Ecl. 245: ἐπέστησε καὶ ἐπιστάσεως ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἠπόρησε καὶ ἀπορίας ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα· οὕτω χρωμένων τῶν Στωϊκῶν φιλοσόφων πολλάκις ἀκήκοα, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαίως ἢ δοκίμως, ἄξιον ἐπισκέψεως (‘ἐπέστησε (‘[(s)he] fixed [her/his] attention’) and ἐπιστάσεως ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα (‘the fact [is] worthy of attention’) instead of ἠπόρησε (‘(s)he hesitated’) and ἀπορίας ἄξιον τὸ πρᾶγμα (‘the fact [is] worthy of hesitation’): I have often heard the Stoics express themselves in this way; whether this is in accordance with ancient usage and commendable is… worthy of consideration (ἄξιον ἐπισκέψεως)!’); Phryn. Ecl. 302Phryn. Ecl. 302: ἐνάρετος· πολὺ παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς κυκλεῖται τοὔνομα, οὐκ ὂν ἀρχαῖον (‘ἐνάρετος (‘virtuous’): This word circulates widely among the Stoics, and yet it is not ancient’).

Most importantly, the characterisation of περίστασις as ‘Stoic’ is due to the fact that Stoic philosophers employed the term as a terminus technicus ‘in various ethical discussions’ (Fitzgerald 1988, 35). One example is the problem of evil, which is central to Stoic theodicy. The latter is based on the assumption that the world is governed by divine providence; as a consequence, ‘any apparent defects in the cosmic order are merely apparent, or else […] they are necessary and inescapable side-effects of God’s optimal design’ (Powers 2025, 285, with further references; italics are the author’s). Within this framework, a περίστασις is a circumstance that, while not inherently bad, may cause afflictions to human beings. According to Stoic providentialism, however, περιστάσεις of any kind are sent by God to test a person’s virtue, as explicitly stated in C.5.

While it is true that the abstract meaning of περίστασις becomes increasingly common in Post-classical Greek – and this may have been enough to raise a purist’s eyebrows – it is possible that the Antiatticist’s interest in the word (and, subsequently, Phrynichus’ reply to him) was prompted by a locus classicus exhibiting a particular usage of the term. Admittedly, the abridged state of the lexicon does not allow us to determine whether the entry in question explicitly mentioned any literary passage. Nevertheless, that the Antiatticist referred to a particular instance of περίστασις is suggested by its definition of it as a ὑπερβάλλουσα συμφορά. As συμφορά, which commonly means ‘event, circumstance, hap’, is in itself a vox media and may refer to either misfortune or, more rarely, happy events, one might be tempted to conclude that the participle ὑπερβάλλουσα simply indicates that in A.1 the noun συμφορά is being used in a negative sense (‘bad circumstance’). However, there are much simpler ways to specify a vox media like συμφορά (e.g. by adding an epithet like κακή ‘bad’ or the like). Moreover, the phrase ὑπερβάλλουσα συμφορά closely resembles other expressions used to refer to calamities that exceed all measure, which may shed light on the real meaning of the Antiatticist’s words. See e.g. Aesch. Pers. 291–2, spoken by Atossa with reference to the Persians’ defeat at Salamis: ὑπερβάλλει γὰρ ἥδε συμφορά | τὸ μήτε λέξαι μήτ᾿ ἐρωτῆσαι πάθη (‘The event is so monstrous that one can neither speak nor ask about the sufferings it involved’; transl. Sommerstein 2009, 49); cf. also Isoc. 14.55: τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντα καταφυγὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἄπολιν γενόμενον καθ᾿ ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν κακοπαθεῖν καὶ τοὺς αὑτοῦ περιορᾶν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐπαρκεῖν, τί δεῖ λέγειν ὅσον τὰς ἄλλας συμφορὰς ὑπερβέβληκεν; (‘but to have no refuge, to be without a fatherland, daily to suffer hardships and to watch without having the power to succour the suffering of one’s own, why need I say how far this has exceeded all other calamities?’; transl. Van Hook 1945, 165–7). In light of these parallels, we may assume that the Antiatticist’s definition of περίστασις as ὑπερβάλλουσα συμφορά was prompted by a literary passage in which περίστασις was used to indicate not merely a difficulty, but an exceptionally unfortunate event.

However, if this is the case, the Antiatticist’s source may have been a non-Attic (or simply non-canonical) author, since in his reply Phrynichus (A.2) appears particularly keen to emphasise that the evidence he adduces is beyond dispute, as it is drawn from both comedy and tragedy. Phrynichus’ assertion is itself problematic, since there are no extant occurrences of περίστασις in tragedy. As is often the case in such instances, one may suppose that Phrynichus had a locus classicus in mind that is now lost (accordingly, Phrynichus’ entry is included in TrGF vol. 2 as trag. adesp. fr. 596Trag. adesp. fr. 596). Yet, as noted by Bagordo (2013, 183), Phrynichus may instead have been referring to tragic occurrences of the verb περιίστημι and the adverb περισταδόν ‘standing round about’, since these forms could support his doctrine: see Soph. Tr. 194–5: κύκλῳ γὰρ αὐτὸν Μηλιεὺς ἅπας λεὼς | κρίνει περιστάς (‘The whole people of Malis is standing around him and questioning him’; transl. Lloyd-Jones 1994, 149); Eur. Ba. 1106–7: περιστᾶσαι κύκλῳ | πτόρθου λάβεσθε, μαινάδες (‘Maenads, circle round and take hold of the tree’; transl. Kovacs 2003, 121); Eur. Andr. 1136–7: ὡς δέ νιν περισταδὸν | κύκλῳ κατεῖχον οὐ διδόντες ἀμπνοάς κτλ. (‘But when they encircled him and gave him no space to breathe’ etc.; transl. Kovacs 1995, 377). Furthermore, as suggested by Rutherford (1881, 473; see also Bagordo 2013, 183), Phrynichus may also have had the rare adjective περίστατος (‘surrounded and admired by the crowd’, but also ‘standing round and wondering’) in mind. The adjective is found in two poets of Old Comedy, Eupolis (fr. 188) and Theopompus Comicus (fr. 42.3), as well as in Isocrates (2x).

E. Byzantine and Modern Greek commentary

In its abstract meanings, περίστασις is attested in Medieval Greek, where it is widely used across all linguistic registers with the meaning ‘state of affairs, circumstances’ (also as a euphemism for ‘bad circumstance’) – but it can also refer to a man’s ‘character’ and ‘qualities’ (see Kriaras, LME s.v.). περίστασις remains common in Modern Greek with the meaning ‘state of affairs, circumstances’ (see e.g. the phrase στέκομαι στο ύψος των περιστάσεων, ‘rise to the occasion’).

F. Commentary on individual texts and occurrences

(1)    Su. π 1295 (B.3)

The entry is problematic for a number of reasons. For a start, the unattributed quotation at the end of the entry (διὰ δὲ τὴν περίστασιν τοῦ κήρυκος φωνήσαντος ἀνέστη) is rather obscure. Bernhardy (1853 vol. 2, 230) translated ‘cum autem praeco intenta voce pronunciasset, surrexit’ (‘when the herald had spoken in a loud voice, (s)he rose’), stating that here περίστασις means contentio ‘strain’ (a similar translation is offered by Küster 1705 vol. 3, 96). I prefer translating ‘owing to the critical situation’ etc., thereby interpreting the syntagm διὰ τὴν περίστασιν as in Polybius’ passage (1.32.3) mentioned immediately before in the entry. If this interpretation is correct, the structure of the entry becomes clearer: the first set of quotations illustrates one meaning of περίστασις (‘pomp, splendour’), whereas the last two exemplify another (‘critical situation’). Even so, the syntagms ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασις and ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασιν, which refer to the first and second sets of examples respectively, remain unclear. One of the two must be out of place, especially since the usual meaning of ἐπίτασις (‘stretching, intensity, emphasis’) can hardly correspond to those of περίστασις. Various attempts have been made to find a solution. Küster’s (1705 vol. 3, 96 n. 6) suggestion that, in writing ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασις, the compilator may have had in mind the word περίτασις (lit. ‘extension all round’) rather than περίστασις is unconvincing. Bernhardy (1853 vol. 2, 229–30), for his part, proposed transposing ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασις so that it stands immediately before the last quotation, thereby deleting ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασιν. Still, the semantic difficulty posed by ἐπίτασις would remain unresolved. I would suggest that ἐπίτασις means ‘critical moment’ here: cf. Su. ε 2498: ἐπὶ ξυροῦ· ἐπὶ κινδύνου, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπιτάσει (‘ἐπὶ ξυροῦ (‘on a razor’s edge’): In the face of danger, right at the height of the crisis’). Understood in this way, ἐπίτασις would be an appropriate rendering of περίστασις – though, of course, only with regard to the last two passages quoted in the Suda entry. Accordingly, we should retain ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασιν at the end of the entry. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to delete the preceding ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίτασις; rather, we may suppose that ἐπίτασις (possibly due to a saut du même au même) has wrongly replaced a word meaning ‘pomp, splendour’, which was presumably intended to illustrate the sense of περίστασις in the first two passages. If this is correct, we should put a crux before ἐπίτασις.