ἐπιχαιρέκακος
(Antiatt. ε 5, Phryn. PS 71.1–2, Poll. 3.101)

D. General commentary

The adjective ἐπιχαιρέκακος ‘rejoicing over another’s misfortunes’ is first documented in 4th-century Attic texts. Apart from Middle Comedy fragments, including one full line of AlexisAlexis (C.1) and three lines of Anaxandrides (C.2), as well as the title of a play by Timocles (test. 1 = Su. τ 623; fr. 11 = Ath. 6.241a), it is attested in Aristotle and later philosophers such as Posidonius. Its derived noun, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, defined by Aristotle as the feeling between righteous indignation and envy (EN 1108b, MM 1192b), is also often attested in philosophical texts. The meaning of ἐπιχαιρέκακος given in the PS (A.2) is consistent with the Aristotelian definition of the ἐπιχαιρέκακος as someone who rejoices at other people’s misfortunes (C.3, C.4) and thus surpasses the envious man because his vice involves pleasure, not pain. Alexis’ line, quoted in full by the Antiatticist, confirms the association between ἐπιχαιρέκακος and φθόνος (cf. Arnott 1996, 172–3). Apart from the philosophers, ἐπιχαιρέκακος and its derivatives ἐπιχαιρεκακία and ἐπιχαιρεκακέω are found in, e.g., Philo and Plutarch, while Eratosthenes is credited by Strabo (1.3.22 = Eratosth. fr. 20 RollerEratosth. fr. 20) for using the antonym ἐπιχαιράγαθος, seemingly an Augenblicksbildung coined as a play on ἐπιχαιρέκακος.

It is no easy task to unravel the reason why ἐπιχαιρέκακος attracted the attention of Atticist lexicographers, as none of the sources is explicit about the appreciation of this word. Assuming that the Antiatticist tends to collect and defend usages disapproved of by other lexicographers, one could speculate that its entry on ἐπιχαιρέκακος aimed to justify a word associated with Hellenistic prose by digging up an Attic poetic model, Alexis. While the epitome of the PS (A.2) does not allow us to pinpoint the context in which Phrynichus discussed ἐπιχαιρέκακος, Atticist disfavour is confirmed by Pollux (A.3), who deems the adjective ‘just bearable’ (see below). One primary motivation for Atticist dislike is therefore the association of ἐπιχαιρέκακος with philosophical prose, as is indirectly confirmed by the Suda entry on ἐπιχαιρεκακία (B.2). Philosophy confronted the Atticists with the difficult task of mediating between undoubted authorities such as Aristotle and a language that often found vast employment in the Hellenistic koine. In the Eclogue, Phrynichus solves the issue by completely ruling out Aristotle (as well as the Stoic philosophers) as a model: in Ecl. 231Phryn. Ecl. 231 (re. βασίλισσα) Aristotle is grouped with other authors who use ‘bad’ (φαῦλον) terminology, while in Ecl. 285Phryn. Ecl. 285 he and Chrysippus are criticised for using the adverb πρώτως. Pollux instead moderately resorts to some of Aristotle’s writings (especially the Historia animalium, and the various Constitutions) in sections of his lexicon devoted to specialist vocabulary. This is in keeping with the principle enunciated in the prefatory letter to book 2, where Pollux says that the terminology for certain technical domains must be addressed with an eye to the use of experts in those fields (Poll. Praef. 2Poll. Praef. 2; cf. Tribulato 2018, 255–8). The fact that ἐπιχαιρέκακος could not be defended by quoting 5th-century Attic authors, but only 4th-century playwrights, must have strengthened the Atticists’ dislike. Phrynichus’ infrequent use of Middle and New Comedy in both the Eclogue and the PS is well-known (see Tribulato 2022 for an overview). Alexis, the authority quoted by the Antiatticist, is overtly criticised by Phrynichus in Ecl. 212 (re. παλαιστρικός, Alex. fr. 326Alex. fr. 326 = Phryn. Ecl. 212), Ecl. 349 (re. οἰκοδεσπότης, Alex. fr. 227Alex. fr. 227 = Phryn. Ecl. 349) and even more vehemently in Ecl. 316Phryn. Ecl. 316 (on καμμύειν, Alex. fr. 320, see entry καμμύω). No direct references to Alexis survive in the epitome of the PS; the two references restored by de Borries (one concerning our ἐπιχαιρέκακος ἄνθρωπος, the other at 43.1–2 on ἀσωτεῖον ‘the place where destitute people spend their time’) are probable but not certain. It is impossible to tell whether the original passage recommended, criticised, or simply explained the two expressions, and hence for what purpose Alexis was quoted in the PS.

The canon, however, is not the only preoccupation motivating the Atticist handling of ἐπιχαιρέκακος. Another strong reason for animosity must have been its unusual formation. ἐπιχαιρέκακος is a verbal governing compound, a category which, though not rare, was associated with poetic or high-style language (cf. Tribulato 2015, 117 and Tribulato 2015, 423–4 for verb-first compounds based on the simplex χαίρω, which are common in Greek onomastics). More importantly, in ἐπιχαιρέκακος the verbal first member is prefixed and this is very much an exception within verb-first compounds, especially of the classical age: consider, for instance, that while ἀλεξίκακος ‘averting evil’ is already attested in Homer, its prefixed synonym ἀπαλεξίκακος is a late formation. The notion that the unusual structure of ἐπιχαιρέκακος could have been an issue for the purists is indirectly confirmed by Phrynichus’ treatment of irregular or unusual compounds in the Eclogue, where he usually recommends using the corresponding syntagm (e.g. Ecl. 167Phryn. Ecl. 167 on μεσοδάκτυλα, Ecl. 271Phryn. Ecl. 271 on ἀφρόνιπτρον, Ecl. 359Phryn. Ecl. 359 on σύαγρος, etc.). Perhaps in the case of ἐπιχαιρέκακος, too, Phrynichus would have recommended using the phrase ὁ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐπιχαίρων. The suggestion that word-formation may be at stake in the Atticist’s judgement of ἐπιχαιρέκακος can be further argued based on Poll. 3.101 (A.3), though the passage in question is not open to plain interpretability. In 3.101, Pollux deals with various expressions for joy and laughter, a topic he has already introduced at 3.97–8, before proceeding to consider expressions for pain at 3.99–100. It would seem that the reason for this addendum to his previous sections on expressions of joy is the formation pattern of the verbs, nouns, and adjectives collected in 3.101, which are all prefixed. Pollux begins with verbs for ‘encouraging’ (παραμυθέομαι, ἐπικουφίζω), ‘lightening’ (ἐπελαφρύνω), and the like, before moving on to their nominal derivations. He further considers various terms for types of speeches (including λόγοι ἐπιτάφιοι) and finally ends with expressions for malignant joy. Among these, Pollux approves of the verbal passive adjective ἐπίχαρτος ‘one who is the object of malignant joy’, which he compares (ὥσπερ καί) with καταγέλαστος (‘one who is the object of derision’), amply attested in 5th-century Attic literature. He then criticises ἐπίχαρμα ‘object of malignant joy’ (on the correct interpretation of ἐπίχαρμα μοχθηρόν see F.1) and the agent noun ἐπιχάρτης ‘one who rejoices over misfortunes’, just about saving ἐπιχαιρέκακος.

The overall structure of Pollux’s argumentation makes it unclear whether he rejected these forms because of their attestation in ‘less canonical’ Attic playwrights such as Posidippus, Philonides, and – judging from the parallel passage in the Antiatticist (A.1) – Alexis. Concerning ἐπίχαρμα, the compressed language of the passage seems to suggest that the problem was its use in lieu of ἐπίχαρτος, (a usage which is indirectly confirmed by entries in Hesychius, B.3, and Photius, B.4). In fact, this understanding of ἐπίχαρμα is not unattested in Attic literature, as at HF 458–9Eur. HF 458–9 Euripides uses it in reference to persons: ἐτέκομεν ὑμᾶς, πολεμίοις δ’ ἐθρεψάμην | ὕβρισμα κἀπίχαρμα καὶ διαφθοράν (‘I gave you birth and reared you only for our enemies to be an object of outrage, mockery and destruction’). This use, however, is rhetorically motivated: Megara uses ἐπίχαρμα, with two other abstract nouns, to present her children as things. In two other passages (Ph. 1555Eur. Ph. 1555 and fr. 773.48Eur. fr. 773 = Phaeth. 93 Diggle), Euripides regularly uses ἐπίχαρμα as an abstract noun. Pollux could thus have felt strongly towards using ἐπίχαρμα as a pure synonym of ἐπίχαρτος.

At the same time, a likely possibility is that at 3.101, Pollux is attempting to unequivocally define the semantics of certain forms, something that ἐπίχαρμα avoids. While ἐπίχαρτος and ἐπιχαιρέκακος are both subject-oriented (the former to the passive subject, the latter to the active subject), ἐπίχαρμα is ambiguous in that it may indicate both the object of malignant joy and the act itself of rejoicing (as in Eur. fr. 773.48Eur. fr. 773 = Phaeth. 93 Diggle, where the meaning is ‘joy of participation in someone’s happiness’: see Diggle 1970, 112). This may also explain why, at the end of 3.101, Pollux advises his readers to prefer participles to nominal formations (ὄνομα must be understood to include both nouns and adjectives – see the same distinction made in 5.128, B.1, cf. F.2 below). This is consistent with the fact that the sub-section focusing on verbs for malignant joy is opened by a quotation from Isocrates in which a participle is used, συνηδόμενοι (see also F.1 on this form). Unlike verbal nouns, participles are marked for voice and are thus less semantically ambiguous. Following this interpretative line, Pollux might have chosen to ‘save’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος, deeming it ‘just about tolerable’, because – like almost all verb-first compounds – it unequivocally refers to an action performed by the subject. Pollux’s apparent uneasiness suggests, however, that this compound was disapproved of by stricter Atticists, most probably on account of both its unusual formation and its association with Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary.

E. Byzantine and Modern Greek commentary

Atticist condemnation does not seem to have impacted on the productivity of ἐπιχαιρέκακος and its derivations in Late Antique Greek, where they are relatively common. The adjective is for instance picked up by Eusebius, with the seemingly learned variant ἐπιχαιρεσίκακος/ἐπιχαιρησίκακος. The productivity of these words in Byzantine texts seems to have waned: an online TLG search gives a total of eight attestations (excluding lexicographical passages in which these forms constitute the lemma) in learned authors such as Photius, Arethas, Constantinus VII, and Constantinus Manasses. ἐπιχαιρέκακος is continued in Modern Greek in the form χαιρέκακος ‘someone who rejoices over misfortune’ (see too the verb χαιρεκακώ).

F. Commentary on individual texts and occurrences

(1)    Poll. 3.101 (A.3)

Pollux’s quotation from Isocrates 8.87Isoc. 8.87 is imprecise – there is no trace of συνηδόμενοι in the manuscript tradition for this passage, which oscillates between συνησθησόμενοι and ἐφησθησόμενοι (the latter also confirmed by the syntactic lexicon contained in cod. Par. Coisl. 345: see Petrova 2006, 55, l. 6).

(2)    Poll. 5.128 (B.1)

This chapter of the Onomasticon specialises in verbs for malignant joy, mockery, and, more generally, verbal expressions of bad feelings towards someone (see κατεύχομαι in the sense ‘to imprecate against one’). It has several points of overlap with 3.101, which deals with the same semantic domain. Concerning words for πράγματα (i.e. ‘nouns which express actions’), Pollux accepts only κατάγελως ‘mockery’. He rejects χλευασμός and χλευασία seemingly not because they are badly formed, but because they may also signify a kind of ridicule that implies buffoonery and trashing someone in jest. Among the formations Pollux defines as ὀνόματα (i.e. ‘nominal derivations’, not necessarily expressing actions), he again makes an exception for ἐπιχαιρέκακος. Here, the implication may be that while ἐπιχαιρέκακος, being an adjective, is admissible, its derivation ἐπιχαιρεκακία (a πρᾶγμα, according to Pollux’s terminology) is not – but the passage is too obscure, perhaps because of epitomisation, to allow a clear-cut interpretation.